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Abstract 
The paper explores European diplomatic cooperation abroad since 2009 by studying the diplomatic 
structures and practices in two key locations, Moscow and Washington. It analyses the functions of EU 
delegations as part of the hybrid EU foreign policy system and their way of engaging with the changing 
global patterns of diplomatic practice. The empirical analysis draws on extensive semi-structured inter-
views conducted in Moscow and Washington in 2013/14. Our cases confirm the deeper institutionalisa-
tion and intensification of European diplomatic cooperation abroad. The EU delegations increasingly 
took over traditional diplomatic tasks and coordinated member states on the ground. The ability of the 
EU delegations to establish a good working relationship with member states as well as the leadership of 
key individuals (notably EU ambassadors) were key factors in shaping the way this new system fell into 
place, which shows the continued prevalence of hybridity in EU foreign policy making.  
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Over the past 25 years, EU member states have intensified their foreign affairs cooperation through the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty (2009) is the latest in a series 
of institutional reforms aimed at a more coherent and efficient EU foreign policy. It emphasized the 
strengthening of the EU diplomatic toolkit by establishing the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and radically reforming the EU’s diplomatic representation. The Commission delegations were 
upgraded to EU delegations (EUDs) 1 to form  the diplomatic network of the EEAS in third countries 
and replace the representative role of the rotating presidency. The EUDs are now diplomatically repre-
senting the EU (i.e. its institutions and member states) and work in close cooperation with member 
states’ embassies on the ground. EUDs are intended to add value and provide synergies, but not to re-
place the diplomatic activities of EU member states.2 Given these multi-faceted tasks as well as limita-
tions, we characterize them as ‘neither fish nor fowl’ – not having the same diplomatic status and tasks 
as diplomatic representations of states do, but also differing from intergovernmental organisations due 
to their special relationship to member states. 
 The Lisbon Treaty and the 2010 decision on the establishment of the EEAS provide little detail 
about how this new system of EU diplomatic representation is meant to work in practice. This paper, 
therefore, empirically investigates the functions of EUDs and their interaction with member states’ em-
bassies in two key locations: Moscow and Washington. Our research is based on an extensive set of 
semi-structured interviews conducted with officials of EUDs and member states’ embassies in both lo-
cations during 2013 and 2014, complemented by a detailed document analysis.3 
 The role of the EUDs and their distinct diplomatic and coordination tasks are shaped by the 
peculiar nature of the EU foreign policy system. On the other hand, EUDs also encounter pressures due 
to the changing global patterns of diplomatic practice and the expectations of other actors, most notably 
the host country. Our contribution aims to investigate how the EU delegations, in interaction with mem-
ber states’ embassies, have come to define their diplomatic tasks within the EU’s hybrid foreign policy 
system, where the Union’s external relations fall under the competence of the delegations, while the task 
of political representation is shared between the delegations and member states’ embassies. 
 Since the EU is not a state, it does not fit into the traditional categories of a diplomatic actor. 
Duquet’s legal analysis4 concerning the constraints of EU diplomatic action imposed by diplomatic law 
and by EU competences therefore provides a necessary context for this investigation. In spite of legal 
 
1 For Lisbon Treaty adaptations see Federica Bicchi and Heidi Maurer, ‘European Cooperation Abroad: European Diplomatic 
Cooperation Outside EU Borders. Introduction to the Special Issue’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy vol. 13, no. 1 
(2018), xx-xx, this issue. 
2 For member states relations to the EEAS see Rosa Balfour, Catharina Carta & Kristi Raik (Eds.), The European external 
action service and national foreign ministries : convergence or divergence? (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2015). 
3 The empirical analysis draws on 17 extensive semi-structured interviews conducted in Moscow, 43 interviews in Washington 
and numerous informal discussions with EEAS officials in Brussels during 2013 and 2014. All interviews were con-
ducted following a semi-structured interview guide. Direct quotations are included only if approved by the interviewee, 
and referred to according to the numbered interview as recorded by the authors. To encourage a higher level of openness 
interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. 
4 Sanderijn Duquet, ‘Bound or Unbridled? A Legal Perspective on the Diplomatic Functions of European Union Delegations’, 






constraints, at a symbolic level, the EEAS can be seen as a challenge to the ‘boundaries of legitimate 
state practice’, thus giving rise to ‘symbolic struggles’ that are underpinned by the key question of the 
role of the state in diplomacy.5 The state-centric perception has dominated modern diplomacy, but it has 
been challenged by increasing global interdependence and the changing nature of statehood, power, and 
sovereignty. Diplomatic practices have been altered by a number of factors including increased involve-
ment of non-state actors, multilateralisation, increased relevance of a variety of issue-sectors, and the 
growth of public diplomacy.6 While states remain key actors in the institution of diplomacy, they need 
to adapt to these global developments.  
 Our analysis distinguishes between two functions of EUDs: first, their tasks of traditional dip-
lomatic representation (towards the host country), and second, their EU-specific coordination role. Un-
der the first function, the delegations take over traditional diplomatic tasks of formally representing the 
Union towards the host government and other local actors, act as the eyes and ears of the EU on the 
ground, and provide regular reporting and analysis. In addition, they engage in outreach and public 
diplomacy. The second function implies that EUDs are responsible for coordination among member 
states. Despite the abolishment of the pillars with the Lisbon treaty, the ‘hybrid structure of EU external 
relations’7 remains, and EU delegations do not replace national diplomatic structures in order to build 
towards ‘some purer state’ but they are instead tasked ‘to look for means of coordination and coalition-
building within the structure’.8  
 While the latter objective certainly means an additional responsibility for the EU delegations in 
the political realm, Bruter shows that also in the past Commission delegations had to reconcile two 
opposing objectives: on the one hand ‘developing autonomous areas of influence’, while on the other 
hand ‘transform[ing] conflicting relations with national embassies into fruitful cooperation’.9 Indeed, 
even before the establishment of the EEAS, cooperation in the field of CFSP moved ‘beyond intergov-
ernmentalism’,10 as evidenced by the emergence of complex transgovernmental networks of policy ex-
perts and increased ‘reflex-coordination’11. The establishment of the EEAS marks another step ‘beyond 
intergovernmentalism’, towards enhanced coordination and new forms of transgovernmental coopera-
tion. As an institutional innovation, the EEAS is in a ‘danger of being misconceptualized’, as it draws 
upon different organizational principles and practices and has to respond to ‘conflicting sets of expec-
tations’.12 During its first years of existence, the EEAS struggled to gain acceptance and support from 
 
5 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Europe’s New Diplomats: Symbolic Power, the Diplomatic Field and the EU’s External Action 
Service’, Review of International Studies vol. 40, no. 4 (2013), 657-681. 
6 Simon Duke, ‘Preparing for a European Diplomacy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 40, no. 5 (2002), 849–70; 
Chris Hill and William Wallace, ‘Diplomatic Trends in the European Community’, International Affairs vol. 55, no. 1 
(1979), 47-66. 
7 Michael Smith, ‘Still Rooted in Maastricht: EU External Relations as a ‘Third-generation Hybrid’, Journal of European 
Integration, vol. 34, no. 7 (2012), p. 700.  
8 Smith, ‘Still Rooted in Maastricht’, p. 713.  
9 Michael Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a State: The External Delegations of the European Commission’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, 1999, p. 193. 
10 Helene Sjursen, ‘Not so intergovernmental after all? On democracy and integration in European Foreign and Security Policy’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 8 (2011), 1078-1095. 
11 Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska ‘Playing the Brussels game: Strategic socialisation in the CFSP Council Working 
Groups’, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 10 no. 11 (2006). 
12 Jozef Batora 2013, ‘The “Mitrailleuse Effect”: The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in 
Diplomacy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, no. 4: 598-613 (2013). 
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both EU institutions and member states. The latter, especially the national foreign ministries, have har-
boured suspicions that the EEAS was competing with their traditional role in diplomacy.13  
 This contribution tackles the first main research focus of this special issue by showing how the 
functions of the two key EUDs have been institutionalized since 2010. They face competing and some-
times conflicting demands from different actors in the EU foreign policy structures, including the EEAS 
headquarters, Commission and member states. Apart from structural factors stemming from the hybrid 
nature of EU external relations, the empirical analysis points to the relevance of personalities especially 
in the transition phase, when new practices of delegations were being shaped.  
 The two cases examined below are in many respects atypical among the 131 bilateral EU dele-
gations across the globe. Both are highly political cases, representing the EU vis-à-vis major powers. 
Furthermore, one important area of EU external relations, external assistance, is not present (Washing-
ton) or has relatively low relevance (Moscow). In both capitals, all 28 EU member states are represented, 
with relatively large national embassies and important bilateral relations, which makes the work of EU 
delegations particularly challenging. At the same time, the delegations in Moscow and Washington are 
the largest in terms of EEAS staff posted to a single delegation.14 There are also considerable differences 
between the two cases. The diplomatic environment in Washington is characterized by constant compe-
tition among EU member states to gain the attention of the US administration, although there is broad 
agreement on the general direction of the transatlantic relationship and the role of the US as an indis-
pensable partner. Russia, by contrast (and not only since the Ukraine crisis), is considered by European 
diplomats to be one of the most difficult partners in a relationship where the EU has struggled to establish 
common positions and a unitary voice.15 Precisely because of the particularly challenging nature (in 
different ways) of these two locations, one can argue that they offer insightful case studies for assessing 
the diplomatic functions of the delegations more broadly. If the delegations succeed in representing the 
EU and finding a space next to member states in these two locations, it is possible elsewhere too. 
The empirical analysis below is structured according to the two functions outlined above. The 
following section investigates how the EU delegations in Moscow and Washington adapted to their 
additional tasks of diplomatic representation by replacing the rotating presidency also in the political 
realm, and representing the European Union in the host country. Thereafter we examine the EU-specific 
role of the delegations to coordinate and be of service to the member states. 
 
 
 EU delegations as the eyes, ears and mouth of the EU – sometimes and under certain con-
ditions  
 
13 David Spence and Jozef Batora (eds). European Diplomacy post-Westphalia. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
14 Heidi Maurer and Kristi Raik, ‘Pioneers of a European Diplomatic System: EU Delegations in Moscow and Washington’. 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) Analysis Brief No. 1, 2014. Accessible at http://www.fiia.fi/en/publica-
tion/415/pioneers_of_a_european_diplomatic_system/. 
15 Maxine David, Jackie Gower, and Hiski Haukkala, (Eds), National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the 







The Council decision establishing the EEAS16 states that EUDs would replace the rotating presidency 
in representing the EU externally in political matters and in coordinating EU actors on the ground. How-
ever, it provided limited instructions concerning the work of the delegations. In practice, it was largely 
up to the EU ambassadors and their staff to define and implement new working processes in cooperation 
with the member states.  
While both delegations in Washington and Moscow took over considerable new tasks after the 
Lisbon Treaty, they did not receive a corresponding increase in staff or other resources. Officials work-
ing in the political and press sections as well as senior management (ambassador and deputy) became 
EEAS officials, while other EU delegation staff remained as Commission staff. Commission officials 
receive their instructions from the Commission, while EEAS staff get theirs from the EEAS headquarters 
in Brussels and the High Representative. The EU ambassador holds a double-hatted position with au-
thority over both Commission and EEAS staff.17 EEAS staff in delegations is made up of EEAS officials, 
seconded national diplomats from the member states, contract agents, and local staff.  
 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, EUDs became the eyes, ears and mouth 
of the EU in political affairs. They cultivate contacts, represent EU interests, promote a favourable atti-
tude towards the EU, and report back to headquarters. But they can only do so if the topic at hand falls 
under exclusive or shared EU competences or builds upon a CFSP decision, i.e. if there is a clear EU 
position to represent. Furthermore, they operate in cooperation with and in parallel to embassies of the 
member states. Especially in key locations such as Moscow and Washington, it is out of the question 
for the EUD to replace the bilateral diplomatic representations of member states.  
 In areas where EUDs have a role, they have become important diplomatic actors on the ground 
in both Moscow and Washington. Their staff sends briefing notes to Brussels on a regular basis, they 
interact with governmental and local actors, and they engage in public outreach activities to inform 
about the EU. They do so often with better access to local actors than the embassies of most member 
states. However, the ambiguity stemming from the hybrid nature of EU foreign policy has complicated 
the efforts of the EUDs to find their place in the broader picture of European representation. For instance, 
in public discussions in Washington, the EUD was often criticised for taking an obvious or very cautious 
position, when the issue had not been explicitly agreed with member states’ representatives on the 
ground or in the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels. This is understandable considering the intergov-
ernmental nature of CFSP, but external interlocutors often perceive this role as too vague. Yet, the in-
creased visibility of the EUD has also had a positive symbolic impact, forcing third country interlocutors 
to recognize that ‘the EU is not just a bunch of institutions in Brussels but made up of 28 countries 
working together’.18  
 
16 Council Decision 2010/427/EU, Art.1.4, OJEU L 201/30, on 3 August 2010. 
17 European Commission / High Representative, ‘Joint Decision of the Commission and the High Representative of 28 March 
2012 on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management of Delegations of the European Union’, Brussels 2013. 
JOIN (2012) 8 final. See also High Representative, ‘EEAS Review’, Brussels 2013, accessible at http://eeas.europa.eu/li-
brary/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf; or European External Action Service, ‘EEAS Human Resources 
Report 2015’. Brussels 2016. Accessible at http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_hr_report_2015.pdf. 
18 Interview No. 30, Washington. 
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 The individual factor mattered during the first years following the Lisbon Treaty. The EU am-
bassador’s leadership, in terms of the personality and vision, significantly shaped how the delegation 
would approach its new role. In Washington, a new Head of Delegation was appointed in 2010. The 
choice of person, Vale de Almeida, who was Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s former chief 
of staff, caused initial resentment among member states,19 which had been pushing for an experienced 
national diplomat to fill this important post. Yet,  to contrast the initial resentment, Almeida emphasized 
even more strongly the need to be of service to the member states in all areas covered by the EUD and 
repeatedly reassured national ambassadors that he was not going to infringe on national mandates or 
interests. It was also helpful that a senior French diplomat, François Rivasseau, was appointed as his 
deputy. Member states’ diplomats perceived him as ‘one of us’, someone who was able to relate to their 
concerns and understood how they work. In Moscow, a new Head of Delegation, Fernando Valenzuela, 
was appointed in 2009. He also had long-standing experience in the Commission and was seen to pursue 
a cautious, professional, but not very active line in taking over the new functions and in establishing a 
new relationship vis-à-vis the member states’ embassies. He was followed in September 2013 by a high-
profile Lithuanian diplomat and former foreign minister, Vygaudas Ušackas. The latter introduced a 
more proactive, ambitious, and visible approach that member states by and large highly valued, but 
which also met resistance as it was occasionally perceived as overstepping the limits of his mandate.20  
 Next to representing EU interests, reporting back concise and in-depth analysis to the headquar-
ters became another key task of EU delegations. Some of the staff, notably those posted from the Com-
mission, had to adapt to a new, more diplomatic reporting practice. The link between EUDs and Brussels 
is complicated by the fact that they have more than one principal to consider. Under the Lisbon Treaty, 
the EU delegations have been tasked with informing the EEAS, Commission services, and other EU 
actors such as Members of the European Parliament. Member states’ ambassadors are still involved in 
drafting joint Heads of Mission reports, but it is now the EU delegations that take the lead. There were 
initially no guidelines for the delegations with regard to political reporting, including no rules on the 
sharing of reports. Generally, it was up to the Heads of Delegation and their staff to determine how and 
to what extent they share reports and information, both with member states on the ground and with the 
headquarters in Brussels. More recently, the delegations were instructed to share as much as they deem 
possible with member states on the ground. It is then up to the national embassies to integrate the infor-
mation they receive from the EUD into their reports back to their national foreign ministry.  
 The intensified contact between EU delegations and member states’ diplomats on the ground 
not only changed the perception of the latter but also led to a different mindset within the delegation, as 
the following account of Washington illustrates:  
 
The modus operandi of the Delegation has changed considerably since the Lisbon Treaty 
took effect. Before, when the Delegation was representing only the Commission, it was 
mostly preoccupied by trade matters, and not in the kind of constant contact with member 
state embassies that is now routine.  […] This, and recruitment of national diplomats to the 
EEAS, has implied a huge change in culture and mindset, as well as a big increase in work-
load. But it has produced results. We have become more political, more like a hub for EU 
business.21 
 
19 The Washington Times, 2010; The Telegraph, 2010.  
20 Interviews with member states’ diplomats, Moscow, December 2013. 





However, in Moscow the picture seems more mixed than in Washington due to the confrontational at-
mosphere in EU-Russia relations, which has led to member states placing more emphasis on bilateral 
contacts, for example in addressing trade restrictions.22 
 Apart from actively representing the Union, the delegations became an arena where the host 
government and local partners could reach all EU member states at once: the latter could now use coor-
dination meetings at the EUDs as an efficient way to communicate with the EU28 in one go. The chal-
lenges of gaining access were different in Moscow and Washington: in Washington, most EU member 
states struggle to reach any high-ranking official. Even before before the Lisbon Treaty the US had 
already actively pushed the idea of meeting all EU member states at the same time in the delegation for 
debriefs and other exchanges. With the new role of the delegation, such exchanges with the EU28 be-
came standard practice. High-level Russian officials, however, were often not keen to address the EU28 
together. At the same time, it was difficult for all but the largest member states to gain access to Moscow 
at all. Russia preferred a  ‘divide and rule’ approach, but inadvertently promoted a sense of unity among 
member states due to its confrontational tactics and the similiarity of problems in bilateral relations with 
a number of countries (notably trade restrictions).  
 A successful example of joint representation in Moscow on a politically-sensitive and contro-
versial matter was a hearing in the Russian Duma on the human rights situation in the EU in May 2012. 
The Head of the EU delegation spoke on behalf of the Union at the hearing. The event was preceded by 
the lengthy preparation of a joint position by the member states, and the process succeeded in bringing 
the member states closer together and made them more aware of each other’s views. On a more cynical 
note, human rights are a rare foreign policy issue that member states gladly delegate to the EU, so it 
does not complicate bilateral political and economic relations.  
 Yet even the US, while generally supportive of a coordinated EU position, has occasionally 
preferred bilateral approaches when the EU position was assumed to be unfavourable. Local actors in 
Washington often criticised the delegation for failing to take a clear stance and act in a decisive manner. 
This cautious behaviour stemmed from the lack of clarity in the initial mandate and the EUD’s reluctance 
to challenge the role of member states’ embassies. In the absence of a clear EU stance, the delegation 
tried be involved and visible to the host country, but did not want to be perceived by member states as 
taking a political stance. Here another observable tension between diplomatic roles of the EU delegation 
is revealed: on the one hand, it is meant to get the highest access possible and thus has to promote the 
EU’s standing; on the other, member states’ diplomats are additionally tasked with ensuring that their 
country stands out in meetings with the host country.   
 In key locations such as Washington and Moscow, the EUDs do not in any way challenge or 
replace bilateral political relations of member states with the host country. After the first few months of 
getting used to the post-Lisbon system, member states’ diplomats reported smooth interaction and val-
ued the work of the EUD.23 Member states generally appreciated that the EUD took the lead in address-
ing highly technical issues with the host government, such as financial affairs, food safety and consumer 
protection, and transport. Surprisingly, member states’ diplomats on the ground recognised the role of 
the EUD post-Lisbon more quickly than the EEAS headquarters in Brussels. Between 2010-12, the link 
 
22 Interviews with member states’ diplomats, Moscow, December 2013.  
23 For more empirical details see Heidi Maurer, ‘An upgraded EU delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic 
coordination: insights from Washington’. In Spence, David, and Batora, Jozef (eds). European Diplomacy post-West-
phalia. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) pp. 274-287.  
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between the EUDs and Brussels was weak both top-down and bottom-up. The EUDs were in an ambig-
uous position because of the lack of clear instructions and/or feedback on their work from Brussels. No 
clear definition was provided concerning the scope of their competences towards the host administration 
and vis-à-vis member states’ embassies, including a clear delimitation on where and when the EUDs 
can and should take the lead. This often prevented them from acting in a proactive manner, especially 
in political affairs. Furthermore, the delegations were not always well-informed about relevant Brussels 
processes and discussions. For example, national embassies often received summaries of the Council 
meetings in Brussels faster than the delegation staff. National diplomats serving in the delegation had 
an advantage in this case, since they usually received timely national reporting from their home coun-
try’s representation to the EU. On the positive side, this initial leeway on the ground seemed to have 
resulted in stronger ownership among national diplomats and readiness to support the EUDs.  
 In the bottom-up flow of information, the EUDs’ contribution to EU policy was weak during 
the initial years, but has been gradually improving. It was also felt in the EUDs that the EEAS head-
quarter could make more regular requests for specific contributions, such as for upcoming summits and 
other high-level meetings. After the initial build-up phase, the EEAS started paying more attention to 
the need to develop a stronger and more systematic link between the EUDs and headquarters in order to 
make better use of the EUDs in EU foreign policy making.24 
 Our empirics also highlight how, in very different ways, both the US and Russia played a role 
in pushing member states to take advantage of the work of the EUDs. The attitudes of the host country 
were shaped by different expectations towards the EU: in case of the US, the delegation was expected 
to represent a unitary actor and was criticized for not acting like an embassy, whereas in the case of 
Russia its role was downplayed because it did not represent a unitary state and did not quite function 
like an embassy. The (geo)political interests of the host country were reflected in their approaches to the 
EU delegation: while the US wished for the EU to be a more unified partner, Russia displayed a strategic 
interest to divide Europe. 
 
 
 The EU-specific function of the delegations: Coordinating and being of service to the mem-
ber states 
 
Besides representing the European Union, the delegations also replaced the rotating presidency in coor-
dinating the European presence on the ground. This role is particular to the European Union´s foreign 
policy system, as the increased coordination between EU institutional and member state actors is aimed 
at providing added value, coherence, and possibilities for synergies. Coordination attempts took place 
before the Lisbon Treaty, but depended very much on individual initiatives. 
 Facilitating exchange and the possibility for socialisation among member states’ representatives 
is a traditional function of the EU negotiation structure in Brussels. The EU delegations in Moscow and 
 






Washington have paid considerable attention to this aspect of their work. The starting point was chal-
lenging, as various rumours were floating around that the EU delegations would overshadow national 
embassies and even seek to replace them.25 To counter such perceptions, the delegations tried to make 
themselves useful to the member states, while ensuring that they were not perceived as overstepping the 
space assigned to them. They stressed their goal of supporting member states through increased coordi-
nation and sharing of information on the ground.  
 The most visible regular activity of the delegations vis-à-vis embassies of the member states are 
the coordination meetings at various levels. Before the Lisbon Treaty, there were monthly meetings at 
the ambassadorial level, and the presidencies held the prerogative to decide to what extent they would 
organize meetings at other levels. In the post-Lisbon setting, the meetings take place on a regular basis 
at different levels: Heads of Mission, their deputies, and heads of sections or counsellors. In Moscow 
and Washington, member states’ diplomats generally appreciated the coordination meetings and 
acknowledged an improvement. Meetings were considered most useful when they had a well-prepared 
agenda and a clear purpose, and when meetings of different levels and formats were connected to each 
other and to the EU policy process. Overall, it is the regular meetings of the Deputy Heads of Mission 
that are considered to be the linchpin of coordination, as they are responsible for overseeing the work of 
all other levels.26 
Importantly, the interviewed diplomats generally shared the view that the level of ambition was rather 
low with regard to the impact of coordination and the goal of promoting foreign policy coherence and 
unity on the ground. This related to the rather broad definition of coordination (i.e. meeting and talking). 
Meetings were for the most part not aimed at reaching a common position or taking decisions. Many 
diplomats also noted that EU policy is decided in the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, not in the 
field. They would, of course, share their views, report a summary of those discussions back to their 
capitals, and attempt to influence the decision of their country in a certain manner, but diplomats in the 
field are generally not meant to decide on foreign policy. In principle this does not, however, prevent 
the delegations from identifying shared positions on the ground and feeding them back to the capitals 
and the Brussels machinery. 
 Member states’ diplomats in Moscow and Washington characterized the coordination meetings 
as valuable for exchanging views, networking, receiving information about the activities of the delega-
tion and other member states, and improving their analysis of what is going on in the partner country, 
its relations with the EU, and its bilateral relations with other member states. ‘Hearing feedback from 
 
25 See for example ‘Finnish missions not to be replaced by EU delegations’, Minisry of Foreign Affairs of Finland News of 29 
July 2011. Accessed: http://www.formin.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=225717&contentlan=2&culture=en-US; or 
‘The EU is stealing Britain's diplomatic influence - and so we must leave’, Telegraph 24 June 2015, Accessed: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/11697331/The-EU-is-stealing-Britains-diplomatic-influ-
ence-and-so-we-must-leave.html; also the House of Lords report from 23 March 2013 states that the Minister of Europe 
in particular emphasized that the EEAS is not going to replace the FCO, which highlights the need to clarifly this explic-
itly.  
26 In Moscow, Deputy Heads of Mission meet monthly. In Washington, the deputies meet weekly, while the ambassadors 
only meet once per month. In the US, a stronger coordination mechanism has been evolving for decades. See Paul Taylor, 
‘Political Cooperation among the EC member states’ Embassies in Washington’, Journal of European Integration, vol. 4, no. 
1 (1980), pp. 28–41. 
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others’, ‘enriching one’s understanding for certain positions’27 or ‘finding out who is concerned by cer-
tain issues’28 are just some of the added value that member states diplomats reported in Washington. 
Additionally, for rotating diplomats who just arrived, those meetings were a highly efficient and quick 
way of creating networks in a new post.29  
 The meetings frequently hosted high-level Russian or US guest speakers, including officials, 
politicians, experts, and activists. In Washington, most member states valued the meetings as an oppor-
tunity to gain access to higher levels of state department and White House officials than they would be 
able to reach on their own. In Moscow, this aspect was somewhat less relevant, since high-level Russian 
officials were reportedly less keen to address the EU28 together.  
 Unsurprisingly, it is the smaller and mid-sized member states in particular that experienced the 
added value and efficiency of coordination and information sharing, as they do not have the same re-
sources as bigger member states.30 They appreciated the opportunities provided by the delegations to 
receive information from local stakeholders, as the need to follow a broad range of topics often goes 
beyond what they would be able to manage with their limited staff. Also, for most small to medium 
sized member states the attraction of EU-28 gave them access on a higher political level: 
 
To give an example about US contacts in the state department: If my UK colleague goes 
there he probably meets someone quite high up in the hierarchy. If I go there, I will be a 
level lower; but if we go there as EU we will be one level higher, i.e. at least at the same 
level like our UK colleague.31 
 
This EU-28 meeting power provides added value for member states that would normally not have access 
at such level and for whom those meetings are a good way to establish contacts with US counterparts 
that they later can follow up with bilaterally.32 Additionally, it is a convenient way of receiving infor-
mation at a high level, and it saves member states diplomats time, energy, and human resources that 
otherwise all 28 would have to invest separately. 
 There were also, however, challenges with regard to EU coordination on the ground, especially 
when a hostile environment and/or tensions in relations with the partner country imposed specific de-
mands on the delegation. The lack of a secure meeting room in the delegation was seen as a major 
problem by some member states in Moscow. The EU delegation in Washington was one of the diplo-
matic targets exposed to US intelligence service activities, as revealed by Edward Snowden.33 EU coor-
dination meetings were characterized as ‘quasi-public’. In Moscow, some diplomats felt they could not 
speak openly, for example about domestic developments in Russia. Yet even a secure meeting room 
would not solve the problem of lack of trust among member states and the concern that whatever is said 
 
27 Interview No. 2, Washington. 
28 Interview No. 6, Washington; emphasized also strongly in interview No. 19, Washington. 
29 Interview No. 1, Washington. 
30 For comparison in diplomatic manpower in Washington see Maurer, ‘An upgraded EU delegation’, p. 277. 
31 Interview No. 12, Washington; similar assessment shared in interview No. 14 and No. 19, Washington. 
32 Interview 20, Washington. 




among the 28 might be leaked. Some interviewees noted that highly confidential matters were not likely 
to be raised at the coordination meetings, whatever the security measures.  
 Considering the importance of Russia and the US as key international partners, one might have 
expected significant turf battles between the delegations and member states’ embassies. This, however, 
was not the case. National diplomats appreciated the added value provided by the delegations and were 
impressed by their quick transition. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission delegations had had few 
contacts with member states (with some variation among locations), but under the Lisbon Treaty the 
delegations quickly became hubs for providing services and coordinating the exchange of information 
between member states. Nevertheless, the role of the delegations should not be exaggerated. They were 
cautious not to overstep the space that member states allowed them to occupy; and the term ‘coordina-
tion’, as used by the actors involved, did not mostly refer to the adaptation of shared positions, but rather 
followed a broad understanding of exchanging information, communicating with each other, and ex-
changing views. The delegations were also constrained by limited resources and considered that they 
would not be able to take on additional tasks without extra staff. Possible new responsibilities of the 
delegations in the fields of consular affairs and defence and security matters were discussed, but member 
states disagreed on the possible role of the delegations.  
 Member states’ perceptions of the EUDs coordination role were ambivalent: on the one hand, 
they appreciated the service-orientated approach and praised its efficiency. On the other, they criticized 
the delegations for not sharing enough. For instance, they demanded more transparency with regard to 
the reports that the delegations were sending to Brussels, which would not be a common practice in the 
field of diplomacy. Shared reporting might help to promote shared positions, generate trust, and encour-
age member states to share their information. Nevertheless, it raises the question of how the declared 
aim of delegations to ensure maximum openness fits with the more traditional diplomatic culture of 
secrecy and informality, despite the current trends in diplomacy towards increased openness.  
 In principle, member states claimed to value a proactive role and initiative by the delegations. 
In practice, however, they were cautious and protective of their own turf, if they felt the delegation was 
trying to impose a particular view or spoke out in public on a matter where no common EU position had 
been agreed. Yet the initial worries of member states’ diplomats largely disappeared during the early 
years of the Lisbon Treaty. The delegations quickly proved that they were not about to stage a coup, and 
were seeking to play a complementary role. The post-Lisbon institutional framework supported the un-
derstanding that member states are a constituent part of EU diplomacy. Member states provided legiti-
macy for EU diplomatic activities on the ground, and it was essential for the delegations to engage with 
member states’ embassies and ensure their ownership. The new role perception of the delegations rein-
forced a mindset of collective efforts:  
 
Before the Lisbon Treaty it was certainly easy to forget that it was also about the member states. 
The delegation was doing its stuff but it was not necessarily that we always had member states 
in mind as well. After the Lisbon Treaty that changed considerably along the lines that we all 
have to use our resources as smartly as possible.34 
 
This new mindset was not only present in the political domain of CFSP issues, but the service-orientated 
approach of the delegations also had an impact on their relationship with member states in Community 
 
34 Interview No. 30, Washington. 
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competences. Commission officials in delegations had to change their attitude and become more open 
and forthcoming towards member states’ embassies. The question remains whether the emphasis on 
being of added value to the member states and on political aspects of the delegations’ work shifts the 
focus away from, or instead complements, traditional Commission policies.    
 EU delegations pursuing this role of coordination hub resembles the EU internal patterns of 
multilateral diplomacy as practiced in Brussels (notably in the Council). The main difference is that no 
policy decisions are taken in the delegations. Still, scholarly insights from the CFSP experience suggest 
that increased coordination in Brussels is also an instrument of socialization and community building 
that leads to ‘social integration’ through ‘day-to-day practices of political cooperation’.35 Regular meet-
ings between and with member states’ diplomats in the EU delegation are certainly not a sufficient 
condition for stronger EU foreign policy, but they can contribute the necessary environment that grad-





This contribution investigated European diplomatic cooperation abroad in two key cases, Moscow and 
Washington. The empirical analysis showed the institutionalization of the reinforced role of EU delega-
tions in European diplomatic practices after the Lisbon Treaty. In spite of differences between the two 
capitals, we found that both EUDs developed in the same direction in terms of finding their new roles. 
EUDs now act in close cooperation with member states’ diplomatic missions. Contrary to some initial 
hopes or fears – depending on the perspective – they do not aim to replace or compete with national 
embassies of member states. In their daily work, they continue to emphasize complementarity and added 
value to national diplomatic services. Concurrently, however, the EUDs are becoming prominent diplo-
matic actors in the field, with more weight and visibility than most national embassies. 
 The EU delegations in Moscow and Washington have adopted traditional diplomatic practices 
and tasks in order to represent the EU, but at the same time they exceed the usual categories of the 
institution of diplomacy by adding the ‘extra-national’ task of coordinating the European actors on the 
ground. The delegations are in a constant balancing act, performing the functions of traditional diplo-
matic missions while also representing the European Union as a hybrid foreign policy actor. 
 Our empirical analysis shows that there was a more pragmatic transition on the ground. Com-
pared to reported turf battles happening in Brussels, the falling into place of the adjusted institutional 
structure worked out more smoothly in third countries. Both case studies showed the importance of the 
‘individual factor’: the personality and vision of the EU ambassador in providing leadership within the 
EU delegation and reaching out to member states played a crucial role in adopting the new role of the 
EUDs. 
 The experience from Moscow and Washington in a comparative dimension also highlights the 
relevance of the broader EU context: the ability to establish good working relationship with member 
states turned out to be most crucial for the success of the EU delegations. This reflects the particular 
nature of EU foreign policy, but also pinpoints a dilemma in EU diplomatic representation: a huge por-
tion of the EU delegation’s energy and resources is dedicated to coordinate with and please member 
states, while the traditional task of diplomatic representation is to focus on the relationship with the host 
government. As an external factor, the attitude of the host country and the situation in the respective 
capital certainly matters, but it is not the decisive factor shaping the EU delegations’ role: the differences 
in political relations with Moscow and Washington did not create major differences in the way the del-
egations operated.  
 
35 Kenneth Glarbo, ‘Wide-awake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and security policy of the European Union’, 




 In terms of long-term impact, we can preliminarily conclude that there is no evidence to suggest 
that increased European diplomatic cooperation abroad would lead to a qualitatively new level of inte-
gration which could be characterised as centralisation or quasi-federalisation. Rather we observe an 
intensification of transgovernmental cooperation, with the EU delegations acting as a central hub in 
coordinating those efforts. As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, European cooperation 
refers to meeting and talking, exchanging views, and getting to know each other’s perspectives. EU 
delegations are not going to take over the task of diplomatic representation from member states; thus, to 
apply the concept of integration would be misplaced. However, EU delegations, as illustrated in the 
cases of Moscow and Washington, make an important contribution to the structures and practices of 
European diplomacy by linking and blurring the boundaries between the variety of European diplomatic 
actors, and between the intergovernmental and supranational modes of EU external relations. They are 
an important and thus far relatively successful part of the EU diplomatic system.  
